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Abstract 
This paper examines the causal factors behind the increase of medical 
specialization in Great Britain, Germany and the U.S. Current research into 
professions usually explains the phenomenon of growing specialization by 
referring to innovations in medical science and technology, competition 
among physicians, the differentiation of research institutions and medical 
schools, government intervention and organizational changes in the delivery 
of health care, but it does not pay sufficient attention to the mediating 
impact of institutional contexts on these independent variables. The analysis 
shows first that the causal relevance of these independent variables varies 
considerably across countries, and second that this variance can be explained 
by examining the role of institutional contexts as an intervening variable. 
Regulatory systems affecting the growth of medical specialization are given 
particular emphasis. 
* * * * * 
Im Mittelpunkt dieses Papiers steht die Frage nach den Ursachen fiir die 
zunehmende Spezialisierung der medizinischen Profession in GroBbritannien, 
Deutschland und den USA. In der Professionsforschung wird das Phanomen 
der wachsenden arztlichen Spezialisierung vor allem mit dem medizinisch-
technischen Fortschritt, dem Konkurrenzdruck innerhalb der Arzteschaft, der 
A usdifferenzierung medizinischer Forschungs- und A usbild ungseinrichtungen, 
direkten staatlichen Eingriffe sowie organisatorischen Veranderungen im 
Medizinbetrieb erklart, ohne jedoch den EinfluB von institutionellen 
Rahmenbedingungen auf die kausale Relevanz dieser unabhangigen Variablen 
hinreichend zu beriicksichtigen. Im Rahmen der Untersuchung wird zunachst 
gezeigt, daB die Bedeutung der unabhangigen Variablen je nach Land 
variiert, um anschlieBend den EinfluB des institutionellen Kontextes als 
intervenierender Variable herauszuarbeiten. Besonders hervorgehoben werden 
dabei jene Mechanismen, die die Zunahme der medizinischen Spezialisierung 
regulieren. 
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1. Introduction 
The theory of professions has undergone some profound changes during the 
past three decades. The first wave of research in the 1950s and 1960s 
strongly emphasized the question of the attributes which constitute a profes-
sion and distinguish professionals from other occupations (Greenwood 1957). 
This "essentialist" approach was superseded in the 1970s by studies which 
concentrated on the strategy of professions to monopolize segments of the 
labour market (Berlant 1975; Larson 1977). More recently research has again 
shifted its focus towards national paths and peculiarities of profes-
sionalization. This new shift in the focus of research was strongly influenced 
by findings such as Rueschemeyer's comparative analysis of U.S. and 
German lawyers (Rueschemeyer 1973), where he showed that American 
lawyers differ from their German counterparts particularly through their 
stronger entrepreneurial orientation. This difference is explained by virtue 
of the greater significance of state bureaucracies for the professionalization 
process in the German case. 
A major contribution of this more recent approach was to emphasize the 
national variations between professionals, rather than the similarities of their 
successes, and thereby shifting attention to the impact of diverging contexts 
on the process of professionalization. Although country-specific paths of pro-
fessionalization have been widely recognized (Heidenheimer 1989; Burrage/ 
Jarausch/ Siegrist 1990), the theory of professions still lacks a coherent 
perspective as to the question of how particular national contexts influence 
the professionalization process. This paper, therefore, takes the differentiation 
of the medical profession into various specialties as an example, in order 
to analyze the impact of varying institutional contexts on the emergence of 
national patterns of the medical profession. To this purpose, the influence 
of those independent variables which are most commonly stressed as major 
causal factors behind specialization are compared in three countries with 
diverging systems of health care: Britain with its National Health Service 
(NHS), Germany with a semi-public and self-administered health insurance 
system, and the U.S. with a system dominated by private health care pro-
viders. Even though these system properties refer to financing and ownership 
structures without any obvious relation to medical specialization, the 
considerable range of institutional variance will prove to be an important 
element of explanation. 
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2. Conceptual Framework 
For the most part, social scientists have paid only scant attention to the 
phenomenon of medical specialization. The medical profession is usually 
treated as a unitary actor so that little room is left to discuss the causes or 
effects of medical specialization, even in influential studies such as Freid-
son (1979: 85), Parry and Parry (1976), or Larson (1977). Since homogene-
ity, and not internal differentiation, is viewed as a basic requirement for 
achieving the status of a mature profession Gohnson 1972: 53), specializa-
tion is often equated with the division of labor between several occupations 
and it is not regarded as an intraprofessional process. 
Medical historian George Rosen was one of the first researchers to stress 
specialization as an important step in the medical profession's development 
(Rosen 1972). His starting point was the observation that the American 
medical profession itself, especially general practitioners, mobilized resistance 
against the emerging tendency of specialization during 4~he mid-19th century. 
After this initial period, acceptance among physicians began to grow slowly 
for two reasons (Rosen 1972: 111). Aside from the growth of the medical 
knowledge base, Rosen attributed the changing attitude to the economic 
benefits generated by the rise of patients' demand for specialist service, 
which allowed specialists to charge higher fees. 
In the following decades, the dominant explanation of specialism, certainly 
reflecting the faith in technological progress during the postwar period, was 
the growth of medical science and technology (Galdston 1959; Goode 1969: 
285; 293 f.; Gritzer/ Arluke 1985: 2 ff.). Specialization was conceived as an 
"historically inevitable process" (Luce/ Byyny 1979: 377) which is forced upon 
the medical profession. The persistence of this technology-determinist 
perception was logical because the tremendous growth of the medical knowl-
edge base remains manageable for physicians only by their concentrating 
on particular fields of diagnosis and treatment, i.e. by becoming a specialist. 
However, as there are studies documenting that several specialties have 
developed without a pre-existing body of knowledge (Gritzer 1981: 256), the 
model cannot claim universal validity. In addition, it fails to explain why 
certain medical specialties have developed in one country and not in another, 
despite similar levels of scientific and technological development. 
While the explanations above all regard the medical profession as being 
virtually passive, only reacting to external pressure, Bucher and Strauss 
conceptualize a more active picture of professions, which are regarded as 
"loose amalgamations of segments which are in movement" (Bucher I Strauss 
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1961: 333). These professional segments are considered to be conscious, 
strategy-pursuing groups with the clearly defined goal of claiming a territory 
(Bucher 1962: 119). Medical specialties are formed in order to exploit new 
technologies or to acquire a professional identity derived from an expanded 
knowledge base. For the first time, this model introduced the element of stra-
tegic choice into the realm of medical specialism. Even though Bucher and 
Strauss still adhered to the tradition of medical progress as the main deter-
minant of specialization, their concept of professional segments as interest-
driven groups which seize an opportunity to stake a claim to a piece of 
medical terrain represented an obvious improvement when compared to 
older functionalist approaches. 
More recently, the impact of market forces on specialization gained ground 
in professionalization theories. The rise of the medical profession is regarded 
as a "collective project" of upward mobility (Larson 1977: 66 ff.), which is 
achieved through gaining a legitimate monopoly for service provision and 
an ensuing control over the market for medical care. Based on these general 
assumptions, specialization is interpreted as originating out of intraprofes-
sional conflicts over the legitimate exploitation of market segments (Critzer 
1981; Critzer/ Arluke 1985). The driving force in this model is the economic 
self-interest of the profession, which leads single professional segments to 
use specialization as a vehicle of claiming a legitimate monopoly over a 
medical field. The demand-pull version of the market model, in contrast, 
again stresses a defensive adaptation to market changes, according to which 
medical specialties are created as a response to increasing patient demand, 
which is stimulated in turn by massive resource transfers into the health sec-
tor (Hofoss 1986: 207). 
In addition to these dominant theories of specialization, several explanations 
were developed with a stronger orientation towards the organizational envi-
ronment of the medical profession. Kendall, for example, has convincingly 
demonstrated that the rapid increase of U.S. governmental subsidies to 
medical research during the 1950s not only produced an institutional demand 
for specialized researchers, but also contributed to the creation of highly 
prestigious research careers in medicine, thus creating a powerful incentive 
for physicians to engage in specialized research (Kendall 1971: 472 ff.). Ac-
cording to these considerations, medical specialization developed as a by-
product of the specific interests of researchers and medical schools, not 
seldom influenced by incentives set by the state. 
Direct government intervention is another factor which has been confirmed 
as a cause for specialization. This has been the case, for example, with the 
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specialty of rehabilitation medicine, which was actively supported by the U.S. 
federal government in order to provide qualified medical personnel for the 
government's medical system for veterans (Berkowitz 1981; Starr 1982: 356 
ff.). In some countries the state even seems to be the dominating force 
shaping the system of medical specialties, either by granting the medical 
profession the right to self-regulation or by bringing the specialization 
process under governmental control (Heidenheimer 1980). However, it should 
be borne in mind that government intervention as an independent variable 
has to be separated from the role of regulatory systems, which must be 
conceptualized as an intervening variable with a transmission and/ or 
transformation function for the independent variables. 
Yet another factor influencing medical specialization is seen in organization-
al attributes of health service delivery. Halpern (1988: 28 ff.), who most force-
fully argued in favor of this variable, suggests that organizational change 
in hospitals and clinics, particularly their increasing specialization and their 
application of new medical techniques often precedes the emergence of 
medical specialties and therefore can be identified as a major cause for 
medical specialization. In summary, five major variables have been stressed 
as being of causal relevance for the growth of medical specialization: 
1. Progress and innovations in medical science and technology, which lead 
physicians to concentrate on increasingly narrower fields of knowledge. 
2. Market forces, which produce inter- or intraprofessional competition and 
thereby increase the incentives to monopolize certain market segments 
by means of specialization. 
3. The impact of very rapid differentiation into special fields of activity at 
research institutions and medical schools. 
4. The role played by governments, either as direct facilitators of specializa-
tion or, more indirectly, as the shapers of the health care system in 
which medical specialization takes place. 
5. Finally, organizational aspects of health care delivery such as the 
changing structure and size of hospitals or medical practices, which 
have an impact on the process of specialization. 
This short overview is not exhaustive but already reveals some of the major 
problems of previous research on medical specialization. First of all, most 
inquiries have been predominated by the case study approach, with a focus 
Dahler: National Patterns of Medical Specialization 9 
on the emergence of single medical specialties such as pathology (Bucher 
1962), rehabilitation medicine (G ritzer I Arluke 1985), pediatrics (Halpern 
1988) or community medicine (Lewis 1986). By contrast, comparative studies 
are as rare as studies which include more than one specialty, and combina-
tions of both are even more exceptional. This frequent lack of a comparative 
perspective1 was highly consequential for the explanatory models. In most 
cases, one or several of the above mentioned independent variables are 
stressed as determinants of the specialization process with no questions being 
made, however, of their range of validity. 
The frequently neglected impact of diverging environmental contexts on 
independent variables is a second weakness of previous research. If, for 
example, the proliferation of new medical technologies varies among equally 
developed industrial countries, this is not simply a reflection of varying 
stages of scientific development. Rather, it would be appropriate to assume 
a similar stage of scientific development, but different institutional frame-
works, which diverge according to their capacity for controlling the prolif-
eration of medical technologies. A more specific example would be the 
finding that economic competition between physicians is the decisive variable 
which propels the increase of specialization. Since it is known that compe-
tition forces are only allowed to play a role at varying degrees in different 
countries (Dahler 1991), it follows that this independent variable is not equal-
ly valid as an explanation across different cases. This is not to say that the 
independent variables stressed in earlier research are irrelevant. They remain 
indispensable elements of any explanatory endeavor. But their relevance must 
be considered in relation to the institutional context that is peculiar to each 
country. Thus, if we want to generate more elaborate explanations as to the 
causes and dynamics of medical specialization, the proper question should 
be no longer "What are the variables that shape specialization among physi-
cians?", but "What are the conditions which allow these variables to play 
a role in the process of specialization?" 
A third deficiency of previous research is the almost exclusive focus on 
expanding forces and a concomitant neglect of restrictions. A good illustra-
tion which runs counter to the routine assumption that medical specialization 
is unidirectionally expansive, is Heidenheimer's reference to the case of 
Danish junior doctors, who successfully allied with government bureaucrats 
in the late 1970s, to reduce the number of specialties from 32 to 21, because 
1 Two exceptions are the comparative studies by Doan (1977) and Bussche 
(1986), both of which, however, are only descriptive and not concerned with 
the causes of medical specialization. 
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this was expected to provide greater flexibility for junior doctors in a 
narrowing labor market (Heidenheimer 1980: 379). This suggests that insti-
tutional contexts provide different potentials for restricting or expanding the 
specialization process. 
The idea that diverging institutional contexts have an impact on the devel-
opment of medical specialization is not entirely new. Some students of 
medical professionalization have mentioned regulatory systems as an im-
portant factor in the process of specialization (Stevens 1971; Halpern 1988: 
25), yet without using this variable in a systematic fashion. Institutional 
contexts have also been dealt with in the realm of di.fferentiation theory.2 
For example, Ben-David (1960) and Stichweh (1987: 241-245) have both 
stressed the existence of different rules of differentiation within medicine. The 
division is seen between scientific medicine, on the one hand, and medical 
practice on the other. Despite a common epistemological inheritance, the 
disciplines of academic medicine are differentiated between knowledge-based 
fields such as anatomy or bacteriology, whereas practical medicine is 
characterized by a client-oriented process of specialization such as pediatrics 
or obstetrics and gynecology. Of course, these different points of reference 
for specialization are patterned after institutional peculiarities of university-
based research and office-based or hospital-based medical care. But neither 
this causal dimension nor the implications for comparative research have 
played a visible role for differentiation theorists. 
As there are few doubts concerning the relevance of institutional configura-
tions as an intervening variable which transforms the independent variables 
into incentives or constraints, the problem now is: how can the institution-
al context be conceptualized as an intervening variable? The institutional 
environment surrounding medical specialization is cerl:ainly too complex a 
variable to be reduced to a small number of indicators. However, for the 
present analysis, it seems sufficient to concentrate on the national systems 
of specialty regulation, because this element of the institutional context 
reflects the way in which historical struggles within the medical profession 
have been resolved in order to handle the problem of medical specialization, 
2 Since medical specialization is a process of functional differentiation, we should 
expect a strong interest in processes of occupational specialization among 
scholars of modern differentiation theory. This school of thought, however, has 
generally remained quiet on the issue (cf. Mayntz 1988; Alexander/ Colomy 
1990). Differentiation theory has concentrated instead on societal macro 
phenomena such as the transition from stratificatory to functional differentia-
tion or, more recently, the emergence of social subsystems. 
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and therefore appears as a promising starting point for assessing the rele-
vance of the independent variables for each country. 
The following analysis of how medico-technological innovations, market 
forces, research and education, governmental support, and the organization 
of medical care have influenced the development of medical specialism is 
organized as follows. In section 3, medical specialization as the dependent 
variable is defined more closely and problems of comparability are discussed. 
In section 4, an historical account of the emergence of specialty regulation 
systems is provided (4.1), which is followed by an analysis of the insti-
tutionally grounded incentives to expand medical specialism (4.2), and an 
inquiry into restrictive factors (4.3). These two sections will show the impact 
of the five independent variables which are summarized and discussed in 
section 5. Taken together, these analytic steps will provide a fairly complete 
picture of the mechanisms which structure the conditions for individual and 
institutional interests in relation to the issue of specialization. 
3. Specialization in Different Institutional Contexts 
Medical specialization, as a dependent variable, often remains nebulous. 
Sometimes it even appears as if the meticulousness of historical accounts 
correlates with the vagueness of what is to be explained. Only rarely the 
question is raised whether specialty status is achieved when a new area of 
medical knowledge has "emerged", or when specialist societies or journals 
are founded, or when the field is integrated into medical education. In order 
to avoid such a lack of clarity, subsequently the term "specialty" is applied 
to formally certified or approved fields of specialization. This focus on 
officially acknowledged specialties should be not confused with the 
availability of special medical services. Those diagnosis and treatment 
procedures which belong to the domain of a particular specialty in one 
country, may belong to a different specialty in another country. Therefore, 
a large number of medical specialties is not necessarily an indicator of the 
scope of medical services. 
A second point deserving elaboration concerns an equally diffuse usage of 
terms. When talking about medical specialization, a distinction is needed 
between the percentage of specialists among all physicians, on the one hand, 
a~d the creation of new medical specialties, on the other. Although this 
paper focuses on the creation of new formally acknowledged specialties, both 
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aspects are intertwined, and therefore a simultaneous consideration is 
required at some points of the argument. 
3.1 Comparing Variances of Specialty Development 
Each comparison requires an operationalization of the dependent variable, 
which allows one to make assumptions about the causal relationship with 
the independent variables. At first sight, medical specialization appears as 
a fairly convenient variable, but, as the following analysis will reveal, com-
parative measurements of medical specialization are too often employed 
without considering problems of equivalence and contextual interference. The 
single most important indicator for measuring medical specialization has been 
the percentage of specialists among physicians (Doan 1977; Starr 1982: 356 
ff.; Hollingsworth 1986: 101 ff.; Rueschemeyer 1986: 130), certainly because 
of their convenient availability in national health manpower statistics. As 
seen from a comparative perspective, however, such data are seldom of 
reliable quality. 
Most U.S. statistics, for example, rely on data compiled by the American 
Medical Association, including not only board-certified physicians but also 
"self-designated specialists", who in other countries, due to their lack of a 
formal specialist qualification, would not be counted as specialists. An 
alternative source for the U.S. is the ABMS Directory of Medical Special-
ists, but again these data are of limited value, since all physicians who are 
certified by a non-ABMS board are excluded, which by no means could be 
regarded as an indicator of inferior specialist status. The calculation of the 
percentage of British specialists raises measurement problems as well. It is 
not appropriate, for example, to count all hospital physicians as specialists3 
because this would include all training positions. According to the British 
concept of medical specialists, it is only appropriate to count consultants and 
the so-called "non-training grades", i.e. associate specialists and SHMOs. 
Although an unknown percentage of senior registrars have completed their 
postgraduate training, this grade is seen in Britain as a training grade, 
subject to a consultant's supervision. If one bears in mind all these 
restrictions of data quality, a much more cautious use of statistics is advised. 
Because data rely on national concepts of specialty definition, the clear differ-
3 As apparently did Hollingsworth (1986: 41) - no details about the calculation 
procedure are provided. 
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ences in specialty ratios (cf. Figure 1) has to be interpreted against the 
background of their relative equivalence. 
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Source: Cf. Appendices I+ II for data sources and calculation procedure. 
Similar qualifications are necessary with respect to another seemingly reli-
able indicator for measuring the dependent variable: the number of approved 
specialties. When the three cases are compared (Appendix III), the most strik-
ing difference is the number of approved specialties. The addition of all 
subcategories reveals that American physicians have as many as 81 fields 
of specialization, German physicians may specialize in 64 different special-
ty categories, whereas British physicians have to content themselves with 
54 specialties. However, this procedure would only lead to valid assump-
tions if the sum of the different categories did not viclate the requirement 
of an empirically grounded cross-national equivalence. Obviously it is not 
appropriate to give equal weight to full specialties, subspecialties and added 
qualifications, especi~lly since there is no such formal differentiation in Brit-
ain. The problem with these categories is that the comparability of research 
units requires that descriptive categories are invariant with respect to their 
constituting attributes. The use of specialist ratios is a research strategy which 
"renders phenomena comparable by asserting that they inhere in a common 
context" (Smelser 1976: 168). Yet it is this very requirement that is not 
fulfilled when national statistics of specialist/ generalist ratios are grouped 
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together because they are constructed on the basis of system-specific criteria. 
These problems lead one to question whether there are other, more reliable 
terms of measurement. 
An almost completely neglected mode of description is the historical timing 
of the introduction of single specialties. Comparing the differences and 
similarities can reveal some interesting aspects such as the chronological 
discrepancies that are to be observed in the case of public health as an 
approved medical specialty. While public health became a specialty in Britain 
as early as 1887 (Stevens 1966: 48), it was not until 1960 and 1976 respective-
ly that it became a specialty in the U.S. (Rosen 1977: 73) and Germany 
(Sewering 1987: B1600). Although it is clear that public and preventive health 
services were provided independently of the existence of an appropriate 
specialty, a cumulative analysis of a larger number of specialties could 
provide some insights into country-specific priorities of health care. 
Another way of measuring specialty development that tends to run in a 
similar direction is to construct a ranking order of the most highly staffed 
specialties. Some of the observable differences are then not surprising, since 
variations in the organization of health services can be expected to have 
some repercussions on specialty development. This is the case, for exam-
ple, with internal medicine, which is the most highly staffed specialty both 
in the U.S. and in Germany, but is only ranked third in Britain. Obviously, 
this is a result of the primary care function of GPs in Britain. They perform 
much of the internal medicine services which are rendered by office-based 
internists in the two other countries. A more surprising difference is to be 
found with respect to anesthesiology. In Germany and the U.S. this specialty 
is ranked 4th and 7th respectively, whereas in Britain it is the most frequent 
specialty (for data sources, cf. Appendix I). A possible explanation is that 
British anesthesiologists, due to the high relevance of pain relief in British 
medicine, enjoy a much higher status within the hierarchy of medical 
specialties. Consequentially, "no British surgeon would be allowed to oper-
ate without the services of a specialist anesthesiologist, in contrast to the 
situation in other countries, such as the United States, where anesthesia is 
sometimes given by nurse anesthetists" (Payer 1988: 115). 
Yet another indicator is a comparison of absent medical spe~alties. As shown 
in Appendix III, there are remarkable differences by which specialties are 
formally recognized. Although it should be borne in mind that formal special-
ization may differ from de facto specialization, it is possible to link the con-
tents of country-specific specialty systems with the more general argument 
of "national styles" in science and technology. As Jamison (1987) has con-
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vincingly pointed out, such national styles have their foundation not only 
in the sphere of philosophical reasoning about "root metaphors of nature" 
Gamison 1987: 150), but also in diverging paths of industrialization and 
institutionalization of scientific research. As Payer (1988) in her, rather 
anecdotal, but nonetheless valuable comparison of national medical cultures 
has pointed out, medicine is no exempt from the existence of country-specific 
characteristics. Medical science tends to focus on particular parts of the 
human body, physicians tend to have their pet disease and technologies, and 
the same illness, against all text-book knowledge, is treated in different ways 
in equally developed nations. Such varying patterns obviously are embodied 
in the specialty orientation and focus of a country. American physicians' with 
their tendency on aggressive therapy, have the most elaborated system of 
surgical specialties and subspecialties; in Germany, where physicians are 
strongly occupied with diseases of the heart and of blood circulation, inter-
nal medicine has the largest number of subspecialties, and British physicians, 
with a comparatively strong orientation towards social medicine and preven-
tion, appear to favor specialties with psycho-social components. 
As interesting as the insights that are stimulated by such empirical catego-
ries may appear, neither the alternative modes nor the routinely used terms 
of measurement for the dependent variable can fulfill the invariance 
requirement of their constituting attributes. If all these categories for mea-
suring the dependent variable cannot be used without serious reservation, 
how is it possible then to construct an equivalent category for describing 
national variances? 
Maybe it is helpful to reconsider that all these data problems have a com-
mon background: the tension between "culture-bound" and "non-culture 
bound" conceptualizations of variables inherent to most comparative research 
(Smelser 1976: 178). Usually comparativists deal with such problems by 
simply increasing the level of abstraction until the variables achieve a 
sufficient degree of cross-cultural equivalence (Armer 1973: 55 f.). Because 
it is only on the basis of variance of the dependent variable that the impact 
of independent variables can be tested, the properties of the variable should 
allow the description of cross-national differences. As the previous discussion 
has shown, the indicators which constitute the dependent variable are not 
identical across systems. The measurement of variance must therefore ensure 
that measurement statements are not a result of contextual interference. 
Przeworski and Teune have pointed out that cross-national equivalence could 
be. achieved by using different indicators to measure the same variable. Their 
technique of "inferred measurement" (Przeworski/ Teune 1970: 114 ff.) 
requires that system-specific, i.e. dissimilar, indicators must have a similar 
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structure of relations. Equivalence of variables across systems is achieved 
if at least two indicators in each system, chosen on the basis of a theoretical 
assumption, are interrelated and this interrelation is found to be similar 
across systems (Przeworski/ Teune 1970: 114-116). 
Although this procedure appears a more sophisticated method for establish-
ing cross-national equivalence than the use of a more abstract language, it 
can not be applied to the present example. First, this technique requires 
quantitative data which allows one to test similarity of relations by means 
of correlating the frequency of indicators. Second, and this explains why no 
such data are available, Przeworski and Teune implicitly require that different 
indicators must be functionally equivalent. This, in turn, demands 
exchangeable variables. For example, if political violence is the dependent 
variable, it could be measured through a variety of different indicators such 
as strikes, urban riots or violent action during elections. In the case of spe-
cialization, however, the number of indicators (i.e. formal training require-
ments, separation between specialists and general practitioners or limitation 
of practice) is restricted and cannot be simply exchanged. 
But at least the underlying assumption that the basic problem of compara-
tive research is "to incorporate into measurement statements the contexts 
within which observations are made" (Przeworski/ Teune 1970: 13) remains 
valuable because it leads to the conclusion that, for the purpose at hand, 
empirical measurements of the dependent variable have to take into consid-
eration country-specific contexts out of which specialty definitions emanate. 
This is not to say that the frequently applied "more or less"-categories for 
measuring varieties of medical specialism are entirely worthless. Since they 
reflect to a certain extent the impact of regulatory systems, they remain 
useful for illustrative purposes. In the meantime, however, more detailed 
i!lformation about the institutional context of medical specialism is required. 
3.2 The Definition of Specialty Status 
The definition of specialty status differs remarkably between the three 
countries. The most clear-cut mode of definition is to be found in the FRG. 
The approved areas of specialization are stipulated in the guidelines for 
postgraduate training (Weiterbildungsordnung - WB0).4 Due to the fact that 
4 As a matter of fact, there are separate WBOs for each regional chamber of 
physicians, but they adhere closely to the WBO issued by the federal chamber 
Dahler: National Patterns of Medical Specialization 17 
the regional chambers of physicians are authorized to enact law-like statutes 
that apply to each licensed physician, the specialty definitions laid down in 
the WBO are legally binding. Analogous to Britain and the U.S., there is a 
clear separation between undergraduate medical education ("Ausbildung") 
and postgraduate training ("Weiterbildung") (Schagen 1989: 100 f.). Not until 
the medical student has finished his/ her education, excluding a post-
intemship practicum, and has been licensed to practice ("Approbation") by 
the chamber of physicians, is he/ she entitled to start with postgraduate 
training (§ 3 Abs. 1 WBO) leading to the certification of specialist status. 
There are three categories of medical specialization: specialties (Gebiete), 
subspecialties (Teilgebiete) and added qualifications (Zusatzbezeichnungen), 
ordered in a hierarchical way. Only the full specialty qualification, which 
on average requires postgraduate training of four years, leads to the status 
of a "Facharzt" (specialist). The acquisition of a subspecialty, which roughly 
takes two years, is only permitted subsequent to the completion of a full 
specialty training. The added qualification, by contrast, may also be acquired 
by general practitioners. Often these qualifications only require a part-time 
training of several months, but the length of training varies considerably, 
extending from four weeks (homeopathy) to several years (psychoanalysis). 
A peculiarity of the German case is the strict regulation of combinations 
between specialty designations. If a physician has qualified for more than 
one specialist certificate, only those combinations are permitted which are 
related ("verwandt") or have an evident connection ("erkennbarer fachlicher 
Zusammenhang") (Narr 1989: 237 ff.). Despite these vague formulations, each 
and every permitted combination is laid down in the WBO. 
Although in the U.S. there is no monopoly for defining specialist status, the 
certifications granted by a member organization of the private American 
Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS) have generally become accepted as a 
reliable source of specialty qualification. Due to the dominating influence 
of ABMS rules and procedures, the following considerations will concentrate 
on the ABMS system. The ABMS bylaws contain three specialty categories: 
the certificates of general qualification, the certificates of special qualification, 
and the certificates of added qualifications (DeLisa 1989). As in the German 
case, physicians may only acquire these qualifications after graduating from 
medical school. While most general qualifications require an average of four 
to five years in post-residency training, for special and added qualifications 
there is a minimum of one year (DeLisa 1989: 173). In contrast to the 
G~rman WBO, special and added qualifications may be acquired independ-
of physicians, which has only the status of a proposal. 
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ently of a general certificate, and there are no rules for combinations. The 
most striking difference, however, concerns the legal character of specialty 
titles. While in Germany the WBO regulations are mandatory, and thus no 
physician without completed postgraduate training is permitted to use a 
specialist designation, certificates in the U.S. are voluntary so that each 
American physician "is free to describe himself as a specialist in any branch 
of medicine without further state licensing or control" (Grad/ Marti 1980: 
13). 
Defining a specialist in Britain remains somewhat ambivalent. Stevens, in 
her seminal work, remarked that it is unclear whether the term specialty 
applies to a postgraduate examination, a position in the hospital, or a field 
of practice (Stevens 1966: 107). By and large, this has to do with the tradi-
tional separation into general practitioners (GPs), who are office-based, and 
specialists (consultants), located almost exclusively in the hospital. Whereas 
the division between these two status groups is marked, different special-
ties among the consultants are more vaguely separated. As opposed to 
Germany and the U.S., where postgraduate degrees and examinations have 
developed a uniform shape, in Britain there is a plurality of postgraduate 
degrees. After graduation a physician may acquire nearly one hundred differ-
ent postgraduate training degrees (Dowie 1987: 120 f.). The universities and 
the British Conjoint Board, a joint organization of the Colleges and the 
universities, grant their own specialist diplomas and certificates (Stevens 1966: 
370 ff.). Yet, the prestigious membership and fellowship examinations held 
by the Royal Colleges, the academic and educational arm of the British 
medical profession, are the dominating form of postgraduate qualifications 
because they are adopted by NHS hospitals as job categories. 
The minimum time of postgraduate training before a physician may take 
a Royal College examination varies between four and seven years (Dowie 
1987: 121 ff.). With some minor exemptions, only Royal College degrees are 
generally accepted as postgraduate education leading to a full specialist 
status. The most commonly held postgraduate qualifications are the DRCOG 
(Diploma of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists), the 
MRCP (Member of the Royal College of Physicians) and the FRCS (Fel-
lowship of the Royal College of Surgeons). M.D. and Ph.D. degrees for 
physicians only play a subordinate role in Britain. 
After completing their postgraduate examination, the aspiring specialist has 
to overcome another, possibly even more difficult hurdle. Whereas GPs, 
independent of any postgraduate degree, have no opportunity to achieve 
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specialist status,5 hospital physicians have to move up the career ladder of 
British hospitals. In the hospital hierarchy, only the highly sought-after 
consultant positions and the less prestigious non-training grades (associate 
specialists, senior house medical officers [SHMOs]) correspond to a full 
specialist status. In a substantial number of cases, however, physicians 
working in a senior registrar position (the fourth rank in the hospital 
hierarchy after completing training as house officer, senior house officer and 
registrar) have already completed their College examinations but, due to a 
lack of vacancies for consultant positions, are forced to stay in this lower 
hierarchical rank. In Britain, therefore, achieving the status of a specialist is 
linked to an appointment in a hospital and is not only an outcome of 
postgraduate training. In the following table, the most salient differences of 
specialty definitions, i.e. the variances of the dependent variable in the three 
countries, are summarized. 
Table 1: Attributes of Specialist Status 
United States Germany Great Britain 
Formal training 
requirements for full no yes yes 
specialty status 
Separation between 
specialists and no yes yes 
general practitioners 
Limitation of 
practice no yes no 
Specialist status 
restricted to no no yes 
hospital positions 
5 A survey conducted during the mid-seventies shows that roughly 80% of 
British medical graduates have obtained a postgraduate degree (Parkhouse/ 
Ellin 1989: 348), which implies that a large number of GPs, on top of their 
· mandatory 3-year clinical training, have also taken part in some sort of speci-
alty training. An increasing number of GPs is also using the opportunity to 
work as part-time "clinical assistants" or "hospital practitioners", mainly in smal-
ler rural hospitals. However, these hospital positions have no specialty status. 
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When reconsidering the problems discussed above to measure the depen- · 
dent variable, it could be assumed that a more proper category for describ-
ing national variances among medical specialties is the stringency of spe-
cialty regulations. As indicated in Table l, neither a formal training re-
quirement nor any other restriction on becoming a specialist is enforced in 
the U.S. case. By contrast, in Britain and in Germany barriers to becoming 
a specialist are notably higher, albeit with a completey different focus. The 
British restriction on specialist positions to hospitals is certainly a constraint 
on numbers, whereas the German limitation of practice has no effect on 
quantities, but rather on work patterns. The fact that regulatory systems aim 
at different attributes of the professionalization phenomenon is important 
in order to understand their impact as an intervening variable. Apparently, 
in the U.S. case, as opposed to Britain and Germany, the intervening variable 
has no restrictive effect on the transformation of the independent variables. 
This means that the U.S. case of medical specialism is most properly 
characterized as a system geared for expansion. This vc..riance was built into 
regulatory systems from their very beginnings. 
4. Expansive Interests and Regulative Institutions 
4.1 Historical Origins of Regulatory Regimes 
In Germany, the WBO emerged out of three sources (Huerkamp 1985: 182-
192; Eulner 1967). First, there was the competition between general practi-
tioners and specialists. Because practitioners since the late 19th century had 
increasingly experienced an encroachment of unregulated specialists into their 
terrain, they demanded a limitation of practice that would restrict the spe-
cialist to his field. Second, the Prussian government authorities were con-
cerned about the effect of insufficiently qualified specialists on patients and 
recommended a solution in the form of professional regulations in 1908. In 
1924, the German physician assembly finally agreed upon the first guideline 
for medical specialties, known as the "Bremer Richtlinie" (Sewering 1987). 
This guideline not only stipulated the length and content of required post-
graduate training for 14 different specialties, but already included a limitation 
of practice (Fachgebietsbeschrankung), which prohibited the specialist from 
rendering general practitioner services and obliged him to practice in one 
specialty only. 
This comparatively early adoption of a regulatory framework in Germany 
was only in part a direct response to the specific problems emanating from 
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de facto specialization of medical work. Already at the 1924 physicians' 
assembly in Bremen, there was concern that, due to a lack of regulations, 
specialization might result in a fragmentation of the medical profession 
(Sewering 1987: 1596). This particular sensitivity - which is the third source 
behind the introduction of a regulatory system - was undoubtedly amplified 
by the protracted conflicts between German physicians and the health insur-
ance funds, which reached another point of culmination exactly at the turn 
of the year 1923/24. The unity of the profession, a topic that British and 
American physicians hardly paid much special attention to, has been 
perceived ever since as a vital asset of the profession in Germany. 
Notwithstanding several revisions and extensions, the "Bremer Richtlinie" 
remained basically intact for more than forty years. The first major innova-
tion, the introduction of subspecialties, was included into the 
"Weiterbildungsordnung'' - as it has been called since 1956. This was in 1968 
accompanied by a further tightening of the limitation of practice. For the 
first time, the WBO stipulated what range of activity "belongs to each 
specialty and where its boundaries are" (Sewering 1987: 1597). These re-
strictions prompted two physicians to file a law suit contesting the physi-
cian chambers' right to interfere in professional practice to such an extent. 
Although the Federal Constitutional Court ("Bundesverfassungsgericht") in 
1972 ruled in favor of the physician chambers' right to impose such re-
strictions, the court also demanded the federal states ("Lander") to provide 
a more detailed legislative framework containing at least the "status-deter-
mining norms", such as the requirements and procedures for specialty 
accreditation, by which medical specialties are approved, and length of 
postgraduate training (Starck 1972: 1492). On the one hand, this decision 
relieved the medical profession's anxiety that postgraduate training might 
become a responsibility of the federal government; on the other hand, the 
"Lander" had a real opportunity to restrict the profession's grip on the spe-
cialization issue. Despite initial ambitions in this direction, the "Lander" left 
the medical professions' extensive leeway for specialty regulations basically 
untouched. Only some minor restrictions, such as the prohibition to adver-
tise more than one specialty, were relaxed (Sewering 1976). By way of 
summary, specialty regulation in Germany, in particular the limitation of 
practice, appears to serve as means of market segmentation for the single 
specialist, and, when seen from the collective perspective, as an instrument 
of intraprofessional coordination that serves to insure peaceful coexistence 
of potentially conflicting professional segments. 
Arrangements for specialty regulation have often been influenced by the 
peculiarities of medical care organization. In Germany, for example, the 
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whole issue of specialization was perceived as a problem of office-based 
physicians, because the closed-staff model of German hospitals has from the 
beginning excluded the potentially competitive forces from this sector. In 
this respect the U.S. case is different. Traditionally, American hospitals did 
not operate on the basis of salaried hospital physicians. The majority of 
physicians are located in private practice and work in the hospital part-time, 
on the basis of so-called "hospital privileges" allowing them to treat their 
patients there (Stevens 1971: 51 f.). No technical or organizational restrictions 
on the performance of more complex services were imposed on the office-
based physician as medical progress exploded in the early decades of the 
twentieth century. This was particularly true for surgical procedures. As most 
medical specialties, including general practitioners, were accustomed to 
performing surgical operations, specialized surgeons were often forced into 
"fee splitting" arrangements, in which the referring physician receives a per-
centage of the surgeon's fees (Stevens 1971: 83 ff.). This was the context out 
of which the U.S. system of specialty regulations developed. 
The foundation of specialist societies granting a specialist certification to their 
members, such as the American College of Surgeons in 1913 or the American 
Board of Ophthalmology in 1916, was at first an effort by specialists to create 
a hierarchical division modelled on the example of the British Royal Colleges. 
But there was a decisive difference between the two countries. The Royal 
Colleges in Britain had an effective monopoly on determining who was to 
become a specialist, because only their members and fellows had a chance 
of a consultant appointment. The American specialist societies were not able 
to use similar levers and, therefore, developed a different sense of mission. 
Instead of defining medical specialists through an elite status, the Ameri-
can specialist societies focused mainly on upgrading the quality standards 
for every physician (Stevens 1971: 87, 95). 
Furthermore, no single medical organization was able to dominate specialty 
regulation. Lacking an elite institution like the Royal Colleges, the American 
specialty societies had to compete with other organizations, such as the 
American Medical Association or the National Board of Medical Examin-
ers. Without the established physician chambers or Royal Colleges, which 
served as a "logical" governance institution for specialty regulation in Ger-
many and Britain, the U.S. medical profession was forced to create a new 
legitimized institutional vehicle. This was to become the American Board of 
Medical Specialties in 1933, which emerged out of an organizational coali-
tion among those organizations interested in the field of medical special-
ization, most notably the American Hospital Association, the Association of 
American Medical Colleges, the Federation of State Medical Boards, the AMA 
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Council on Medical Education, and the National Board of Medical Examiners 
(ABMS 1990: 99; Stevens 1971: 212 ff.). If today's system for specialty regula-
tion has the image of a "morass of interlocking committees, councils, and 
associations" (Carboni 1982: 122), this has to do with its origins in a 
concerted effort made by the U.S. medical profession. This impression, 
however, should not be taken as an indicator of tight professional control. 
Rather, it seems as if the integration of almost all relevant professional 
segments into the decision making arena has more of an expansive than a 
restrictive effect on the growth of medical specialties. 
As opposed to the diverse and pluralistic anatomy of U.S. physicians' orga-
nizations, the British medical profession has "retained pre-modern segmen-
tations" (Heidenheimer 1989: 535). The existence of a medieval status hierar-
chy including physicians, surgeons and pharmacists was not levelled off in 
the period of emerging professionalism during the 19th century. The 
institutional base for medical elitism was the two Royal Colleges of physi-
cians and surgeons, which, as a result of their royal charter, had a monop-
oly on medical examination and therefore on market access for physicians 
(Waddington 1977: 164 f.). By the mid-nineteenth century, it appeared as if 
the political pressure from the ranks of the disadvantaged practitioners would 
lead to a gradual elimination of the consultants' elitist position. As a result 
of the Medical Act of 1858, a single licensing body, the General Medical 
Council (GMC), was founded and charged with the authority to control entry 
into the medical profession through a register in which each physician had 
to enroll. Because the education requirements for registration, defined by the 
GMC, were not restricted to Royal College examinations, but also included 
examinations from medical schools attached to hospitals and universities, 
the Royal Colleges lost their control over market entry. 
The strategic response by the consultants was to redefine their realm of 
hegemony "by instigating 'postgraduate' ranks" (Sadler 1978: 192). Exercis-
ing their influential position in the hospitals, the consultant elite managed 
to make a Royal College degree, i.e. postgraduate training, a necessary 
requisite for a hospital appointment, thus devaluating the GMC license to 
such an extent that it only qualifies a physician for office-based practice. 
Although this was the constellation out of which today's "referral system" 
developed (Parry/ Parry 1976: 138 f.), according to which consultants receive 
their patients almost exclusively from a referring GP, the separation into two 
market segments did not automatically mean a whole-hearted commitment 
towards specialization by hospital physicians. Interestingly, quite the opposite 
was the case. 
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In the second half of the nineteenth century, specialization was refused by · 
the Royal Colleges because it was incompatible with their internal mode of 
differentiation, which was hierarchical in nature and not functional, aiming 
at the control over medical practice (Sadler 1978: 194-200). In addition, the 
medical body of knowledge which was required for a college examination 
was tailored to the needs of the consultants. It was confined to the main 
hospital-based techniques and to illnesses prevalent among the consultants' 
wealthy clients. The rise of medical specialism, therefore, posed a threat to 
the dominant position of the Royal Colleges. Of course, the Colleges were 
not able to suppress the increasing specialization of medicine which, for 
example, took place in small "special hospitals" initiated by GPs to serve the 
middle class (Sadler 1978: 197). After an initial period of resisting 
specialization through the promotion of the concept of "scientific generalism" 
(Sadler 1978: 195), the consultant elite responded with a similar move, as 
in the case of medical education reform: medical specialism was absorbed 
into the hospital and thereby installed as an exclusive trait of consultants. 
The particular development of British hospital specialism was largely shaped 
by the non-existence of the government and universities as actors in shaping 
the system of specialty regulation. Particularly the fact that medical education 
remained under the control of the upper professional echelon and was not, 
as in most other countries, assimilated by the universities, helps us to under-
stand why pressure for expanding medical specialism remains subordinated 
to the slower pace of the differentiation mode of the Royal Colleges. Even 
though the introduction of the NHS "gave a massive boost to the expan-
sion of scientific medicine" (Sadler 1978: 207) by pouring tax money into 
hospital-based research,6 it was a long time before physicians in the technical-
oriented specialties such as pathology or radiology could overcome their 
"back-room boys" image (Sadler 1978: 199). It goes without saying that the 
consultants today are no longer opposed to specialization. Yet to a certain 
extent, scientific generalism is still influential, as is reflected in the commonly 
used "joint appointment" in NHS hospitals, according to which a consultant 
is expected to practice as an internist in the morning and as geriatrist in the 
afternoon (Brocklehurst 1989). Thus, what is perceived as "boundary 
encroachment" in one system is elsewhere supported even as a means to 
achieve a flexible use of medical manpower. 
6 The impact of the NHS on the development of medical specialties in general, 
however, is less clear. Stevens (1966: 86), for example, remarked: "The strong 
relationship between the Ministry of Health and the Royal Colleges left its mark 
on all aspects of specialist staffing; it undoubtedly discouraged formal 
fragmentation into specialties." 
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Obviously, the creation of these regulatory systems had the function of 
settling some basic interest conflicts over medical specialization, that already 
had country-specific peculiarities. In Germany, the medical profession 
achieved control about the boundaries between specialties and their inter-
nal structure, but no control over the number of specialists. The very same 
thing happened in Britain, where intraprofessional tensions emerged as a 
conflict over social status and access to the hospital. The reinforcement of 
the distinction between GPs and consultants meant that British consultants 
established control over access to medical specialism. An entirely different 
pattern of regulation developed in the case of the U.S .. Unable to exclude 
any physician from specialization, U.S. specialty boards made universal 
specialism which includes all physicians their central mission. In order to 
develop analogous terms of description for the British and German cases, 
additional information is required. 
4.2 Incentives for Expansion 
Incentives and restrictions in this analysis have the status of descriptive 
categories, which indicate the two possible causal directions of the indepen-
dent variables on medical specialization. The use of these two terms makes 
it possible to give short, summarizing descriptions without being obliged 
to mention the impact of each single independent variable. In the three cases 
under consideration, the U.S. represent the system with the most powerful 
incentives for medical specialization. For practicing physicians, the board 
certification has become a "passport to prosperity" (Owens 1989: 60; Olson 
1990), as is indicated by the distribution of income. Board-certified M.D.s 
in 1987 had an annual gross income {before taxes) of $123,080, whereas non-
certified M.D.s only earned an average of $88,850 (Owens 1989: 62). The 
reason for these differences is basically to be found in the higher fees 
charged by specialized physicians. Similar to the individual physician, for 
whom becoming a specialist is almost vital for surviving in a strongly 
competitive environment, segments of the profession are eager to establish 
new specialties in order to gain a competitive edge over their colleagues and 
to upgrade their field of expertise. 
The peculiarity of the U.S. case, especially when compared with Germany, 
is that physicians, once they declare themselves as specialists, are not forced 
to i;tay within the realm of their discipline. Even in cases of far-reaching spe-
cialization, the specialist thus retains the opportunity to provide generalist 
services (Menken 1988: 16 ff.; Fryer 1991: 219-221). This is impossible in 
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Germany, at least in legal terms, where a limitation of practice is rigorously 
enforced (Narr 1989: Rz 407-425)7. 
Another striking variation which sets apart the U.S. case from both other 
cases is the role played by the university. Medical schools are not only the 
province of physician-researchers who, almost by definition, have a marked 
interest in achieving status, legitimacy and financial support for their particu-
lar field of research; in the U.S., medical schools and teaching hospitals 
themselves are eager to foster the process of medical specialization. In the 
post-war period the U.S. medical school became the object of a variety of 
external stimulations which propelled the trend towards specialization. Of 
prime importance was the rapid expansion of (mainly public) research 
expenditure which completely altered the incentive structure of medical 
schools (Kendall 1971: 472 ff.; Stevens 1971: 348 ff.). The pre-war medical 
school was primarily dedicated to teaching. The post-war medical school, 
however, responded to the expanding opportunity for earning large sums 
of research money by adapting its objective to meet this external stimulus. 
Thus, medical schools during the 1950s and 1960s increasingly developed 
a strong research orientation which, at the same time, altered their finan-
cial and institutional requirements. By once having adapted its internal opera-
tions to external stimuli, the medical school not only became dependent on 
research grants, but also developed a need for medical specialists who are 
engaged in research and research-fund raising. Also, due to the high profes-
sional status of researchers, physicians from outside demanded more 
residency positions in teachings hospitals, which would allow them to fulfill 
the requirement of training that they become certified specialists with career 
opportunities in research. Hospitals, in turn, were willing to increase the 
number of residency positions because this staff group was needed to serve 
as a functional equivalent to salaried physicians by fulfilling day-to-day 
routine medical services (Stevens 1989: 238). Some of these external stimuli 
have been virtually transformed into self-reinforcing processes. For example, 
the growth of residency positions meant educating an increasing number 
of specialists who raised the number of hospitalized patients. The more 
hospital beds were created, the more residency positions were installed by 
hospitals to deal with the growing number of patients, and so on (Hollings-
worth 1986: 104). 
7 Interestingly, the limitation of practice has a much lower relevance in German 
hospitals, where competition, based on specialty knowledge, is largely excluded 
through the system of salary payment. As a hospital physician has pointe~. out, 
"we never ask a colleague about his specialty, but about his capability" (Arzte 
Zeitung, May 7, 1991). 
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Aside from such self-reinforcing processes of producing increasing numbers 
of specialists, researchers in U.S. medical schools have also an interest in 
expanding the number of certified specialties since a new specialty increases 
the credibility of a particular research area, which, in turn, enhances the 
ability of the academic physician to earn more research grants. By assuming 
that the rules for the internal differentiation of academic research into new 
areas of knowledge are much more dynamic than in the field of medical 
practice, the hypothesis is supported that U.S. medical schools have had a 
much greater influence on specialization than their British and German coun-
terparts. 
Although incentives to acquire research money are also present in the UK 
and Germany, this driving force remains much stronger in the U.S. because 
research is not only in the interest of the individual researcher, but also in 
the institutional interest of medical schools, who even advertise their post-
graduate training programs in order to attract more residents (Czinkata/ 
Johnson/ Jelly 1980). Thus, sponsoring coalitions may emerge between single 
research entrepreneurs and influential organizations such as the American 
Association of Medical Schools, which directly participate in the process of 
creating new medical specialties. 
An example for the relevance of coalition building is geriatric medicine. Its 
introduction as a separate clinical specialty has been blocked for decades by 
a coalition of academic organizations on grounds such as the lack of research 
programs and the apprehension that a new specialty may deplete other 
scarce resources (King 1989: 308; Carboni 1982). Only very recently was this 
resistance overcome by another coalition between the boards of Family 
Practice and Internal Medicine, who managed to introduce a Certificate of 
Added Qualification for Geriatric Medicine in 1987 (King 1989: 319). There 
is some reason for interpreting this move as a deliberate decision by family 
practitioners and internists to absorb and control the increasing market for 
geriatric care. The added qualification, teaching guidelines and examination 
requirements defined jointly by the Boards of Family Practice and Internal 
Medicine, are well suited to becoming a typical area of specialization for both 
specialties. It was possible for these professional segments to persuade the 
academic faction at a time of gradual increase in the number of geriatric re-
search and teaching programs. Thus a declining resistance of researchers 
coincided with a growing positive interest by practitioners. In sum, there-
fore, the U.S. medical schools should be included among the major factors 
contributing to the increase in medical specialization (Fryer 1991: 217 f.). 
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A less important, but still stimulating role in encouraging specialization can· 
be attributed to organizational factors of medical practice. In this respect the 
U.S. differs again from both other cases. Whereas in Britain the concept of 
the District General Hospital was more a restrictive force, in Germany neither 
the organizational peculiarities of hospitals nor those of medical practice 
played a visible role. In the U.S., according to Reiser (1978: 150 f.), the 
emergence of large group practices, which eventually matured into 
prosperous Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) the 1970s, allowed 
in the first place an increasing number of general practitioners to concen-
trate on a special field of medicine outside the hospital, so that "the 
generalist could extend his own knowledge and skills by integrating with 
an organization of specialists, which might also enhance his prestige within 
medicine" (Reiser 1978: 154). 
With the exception of this organizational factor, the incentive structure for 
German physicians appears to be quite similar at first sight. Despite the fact 
that income varies considerably among specialties, it is evident that becoming 
a specialist in Germany is the superior career choice. This assumption is valid 
both for physicians in hospitals and for physicians in ambulatory care set-
tings. However, while, for hospital physicians, postgraduate training is 
required because the hospitals' internal structure, which is organized along 
the lines of departments for specialist services, has no room for general 
practitioners, the incentives for office-based physicians are set by income 
opportunities. The fee schedule, according to which the vast majority of 
office-based physicians in Germany are paid (Liebold 1988), has a built-in 
incentive towards specialization. The services reimbursed by the health insur-
ance funds are divided into basic services ("Grundleistungen") and special 
services ("Sonderleistungen"). Whereas the first category comprises services 
which could be provided by any type of physician, the second category has 
a large share of services for which only assigned specialists are reimbursed. 
This payment system is advantageous for most specialty groups, particularly 
in a period of fairly tight health budgets. The relevance of economic mo-
tives surrounding the issue of specialization are regularly raised when new 
medical techniques are introduced and become the object of intense con-
flicts about which a single specialty is legitimated to monopolize the 
application of the new technique (Arzte Zeitung, May 7, 1991: 24). Because 
the German health care system has instituted no significant barriers against 
the proliferation of new diagnostic and therapeutical technologies, medical 
progress serves as an important opportunity for professional segments to 
promote the introduction of new fields of specialization. 
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However, the incentives to become a specialist differ radically from those 
which possibly support the creation of any new specialty. The payment 
system causes a vital interest among the existing specialties against the intro-
duction of a new specialty which will potentially demand its slice of the fee 
pie. An observation in support of this hypothesis was made by Krahe, who 
argued that since 1956, when the above mentioned payment system was 
already in effect, those specialties which have been introduced have been 
typically located in hospital or research settings (Krahe 1978: 218). Although 
this only applies to full specialties and not to subspecialties and added 
qualifications, which also justify an entitlement to be reimbursed for special 
services, the observation remains relevant since it reveals that economic 
competition as a motive to create new areas of specialization may also result 
in the suppression of new specialties. 
Thus, the incentives for practicing physicians in Germany to promote new 
specialties are at best mixed-motive games with a tendency against any 
further differentiation. As far as German researchers are concerned, they are 
exposed to an ambivalent incentive structure as well. In contrast to their U.S. 
colleagues, German research physicians are more oriented towards patient 
care because this area of activity, as a result of the financing system, is more 
beneficial for the medical school and for the individual researcher (Braun 
1990: 55). This may suggest a less compelling interest in new specialties 
because there is less pressure to earn research money, rendering the cre-
ation of a new specialty less useful. However, it is a commonly held opinion 
that the research physician faction is the driving force behind increasing spe-
cialization (Bochnik/ Demisch 1985: 203 ff.). As a matter of fact, the specialty 
societies are the most energetic actors in promoting new specialties. 8 A recent 
survey conducted by the peak organization of specialty societies, the "Ar-
beitsgemeinschaft der Wissenschaftlich Medizinischen Fachgesellschaften", 
revealed that there are attempts to introduce no less than 45 new areas of 
specialization (AWMF 1988: 25). Even though German researchers may thus 
develop a strong interest in expanding formal specialization, they are 
different from their U.S. colleagues in that their opportunities to succeed 
against the resistance of practitioners are much less developed. 
8 The motives were described as follows: "A professor's promotion from C3 to 
C4 (the highest available payment position for German university professors, 
M.D.), his raise in salary and even the academic reputation of his department 
or medical school can all depend on his field advancing from a subspecialty 
to specialty. This is why re~earch physicians strongly urge the inclusion of more 
specialties in the WBO" (Arzte Zeitung v. 3./4.5.1991: 2). 
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In Britain, physicians are situated within a completely different incentive 
structure. Medical progress is not allowed to play a decisive role in the 
British NHS. As a result of strict resource limitations, the diffusion of new 
technologies takes place at a much slower pace than in Germany or the U.S. 
(Aaron/ Schwartz 1984; Hollingsworth 1986). British physicians, therefore, 
are not primarily technology-oriented but rather have developed a less ag-
gressive approach to medical treatment with a stronger emphasis on socio-
psychological factors. It is plausible to assume that this more holistic view 
of illness, which corresponds to the concept of scientific generalism, does 
not support specialization in small technology-related fields of practice. 
The single most important factor influencing medical specialization is the 
division between GPs and hospital consultants. Due to the existence of two 
separate market segments, specialist status is not available to GPs and, there-
fore, becoming a specialist is no factor of competition between office-based 
practitioners. This is equally true for hospital consultants who work 
exclusively on a referral basis. The stability of this arrangement was secured 
by the expanding institutions of collective financing, including the NHS, 
which supported the market separation because the gate-keeper function of 
the GP proved to be an efficient rationing instrument (Honigsbaum 1979). 
This particular division of the medical profession resulted in the creation 
of two homogeneous physician groups, in which intraprofessional competition 
was excluded to a very large extent. 
By contrast, in Germany and in the U.S. specialization is potentially an 
instrument for gaining competitive advantage in a patient market, whereas 
in Britain specialists, i.e. aspiring consultants, compete in a job market. These 
varying functional points of reference are reflected in the way specialist ti-
tles are constructed. In Germany and the U.S., at least in theory, specialist 
titles have to operate as market signals which guide patients into the doctors' 
office (Schagen 1989: 109). In contrast, British specialist qualifications are used 
as status titles which reflect the physician's positioning in the medical 
hierarchy. Because there is no need for a marketable codification, British 
titles, such as the MRCP or the FRCS, do not necessarily include further 
details about the discipline in which the physician has specialized. For 
practicing physicians in general, the whole issue of specialization is of fairly 
low significance. 
If there is any positive incentive for British physicians to promote specializa-
tion, it must emerge from the ranks of researchers. Some evidence for this 
assumption is provided by the Royal Commission, which argues that "at 
present the creation of new specialties is too often seen by the health 
Dahler: National Patterns of Medical Specialization 31 
departments as a way of correcting neglect in particular fields, and the 
medical profession appears sometimes to be too ready to accept the claims 
of small sectional interests" (Royal Commission 1979: 217). Even though it 
seems plausible that specialist groups encourage the creation of new special-
ties, these activities must be stimulated mainly by status interests in view 
of the absence of any direct economic benefit. As is the case in Germany, 
medical schools in Britain are primarily financed through institutional funds 
(Dowie 1987: 268 ff.). For the present analysis, this characteristic and the 
mixture of funding sources is decisive. Aside from the University Grants 
Committee, which mainly relies on money from the Department of Educa-
tion and Science, the NHS regional health authorities are the second large 
source of funds. Because the financing system is based on the philosophy 
of "uncosted mutual assistance" (Dowie 1987: 270), according to which a clear 
charging between funding source and spending purpose is rejected, medical 
schools and teaching hospitals are obliged to participate in patient care. Most 
university teachers hold honorary contracts as consultants with a regional 
health authority so that research and patient care are closely intermingled 
and no clear-cut research orientation has emerged. It may be very well in 
the interest of a British medical researcher to foster the development of a 
new specialty, but it is questionable whether this will increase the credibility 
or the resource endowment of a specialty field. 
4.3 Restrictions on the Expansion of Specialization 
As outlined above, there is no reason to expect only expansive mechanisms 
to affect the process of medical specialization. It appears that the institu-
tionalized rules and procedures, which constitute the process of specialty 
certification, could be employed as a lever against the proliferation of new 
medical specialties. In this respect, Britain stands apart from both the other 
two cases. In contrast to the U.S. and German systems, there is no particular 
institution for overseeing the introduction of a new medical specialty in Brit-
ain. The Royal Colleges and the universities are free to announce new 
specialty qualifications (Royal Commission 1979: 215). However, whether such 
initiatives are translated into employment opportunities within the NHS 
depends on a two-level decision-making process. Each recommendation needs 
the agreement of the Department of Health, which then makes its decision 
after consulting with NHS management and other medical organizations 
(written communication, Department of Health 1991). After having reached 
a general consensus about the introduction of a specialty, Health Authorities 
are in a position to offer training and consultant positions in this new 
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employment category. This brings into play the second level of decision-
making, the NHS manpower planning process. Since 1972 each new 
consultant position, after having passed no less than six "examination points" 
(Long/ Mercer 1987: 126), must be finally approved by the Department of 
Health on the advice of the physician-dominated Central Manpower 
Committee (National Audit Office 1985: 8 ff.). 
This suggests that the central government has at least the opportunity to veto 
the proliferation of new specialties. However, a closer look at NHS man-
power planning shows that the whole machinery is "used almost solely as 
a means of improving the grade balance" (National Audit Office 1985: 8). 
This is reflected in the problem orientation of the various commissions on 
medical education and postgraduate training, which were primarily concerned 
with the development of a proper career structure for hospital physicians 
(Dowie 1987: 28 ff.). Although it is true that manpower controls in previ-
ous years were used by health authorities to recruit physicians in shortage 
specialties, and although there is some evidence that the Ministry of Health 
discouraged specialty proliferation in the early days of the NHS (Stevens 
1966: 86 f.), it would be misleading to assume that governmental agencies 
have consciously intervened in specialty development. If specialty increase 
in Britain is embedded in a comparatively restrictive environment, then this 
is a by-product of the NHS financial straightjacket, which in general restrains 
the growth of physician manpower. Likewise, an unintended and indirect 
restriction on the development of new specialties resulted from an 
organizational factor. Since the early 1960s the NHS hospital service has been 
dominated by the concept of the District General Hospital, a usually small-
sized community institution, which is not suited to harbour narrowly defined 
medical specialties. 
Whereas in Britain the creation of a new specialty requires two steps, in both 
other countries this is a one-step procedure. Once a new specialty is 
announced, there are no systemic barriers against its expansion. In the U.S. 
as well as in Germany, procedures to create new specialties are the exclusive 
responsibility of professional self-control. In Germany the starting point is 
the standing committee on postgraduate training, which is attached to the 
federal physician chamber. Each group of physicians, in most cases specialty 
societies desiring the introduction of a new specialty, the upgrading of a 
subspecialty, or any other modification of the WBO, has to submit an 
application to the standing committee. These applications are broadly 
circulated among medical organizations attaching particular importance to 
the statements from other specialty societies. If an application receives enough 
support, it is elaborated into a concrete proposal, which is then presented 
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to an annual general physicians' assembly. If a majority of the delegates 
agrees on the proposal, the assembly makes a recommendation to modify 
the guidelines for post-graduate training. Although this recommendation is 
voluntary, the regional physician chambers routinely adhere to federal ad-
vice. 
A decision to modify the WBO is always a tightrope walk between conflict-
ing professional interests and an obvious tendency to preserve the status quo 
for office-based physicians. This is indicated in the requirements each appli-
cation has to comply with (Bundesarztekammer 1986: 137). First, a new area 
of specialization must have a sufficient scientific base of knowledge. Second, 
it must be relevant for patient care (not for science). Third, it must be 
economically sound. A fourth, more implicit, but by no means irrelevant 
requirement is the unity of the medical profession ("Einheit des Arztberufes") 
which must not be put in jeopardy through increasing specialization. Despite 
the vagueness of these requirements, it is evident that these criteria, 
especially the third and the fourth, may be employed as an emergency brake 
against applications that have a disturbing impact on the income distribution 
of fund physicians. 
This is the very reason why discussions about each modification of the 
guidelines for postgraduate education are seriously politicized in Germa-
ny. The danger that the WBO may degenerate "into an instrument of fee 
distribution" (Weissauer/ Opderbecke 1988: 106) has already become a reality. 
Only recently, the federal physician chamber has been worried about the 
increasing tendency to employ specialty demarcations of the WBO as a 
means of deciding which services can be reimbursed by each specialty (Bun-
desarztekammer 1988: 305). While the specialty demarcations are becoming 
a growing source of conflict between office-based practitioners, this physician 
group is still united against any expansion of specialties. Even highly reason-
able applications are denied. This has been the case, for example, with a 
recent attempt to introduce the specialty of geriatrics at the 94th Physician 
Assembly in 1991. Despite the widely acknowledged inadequacy of medical 
services for the elderly, to which the lack of qualified specialists has contrib-
uted considerably,9 the proposal was rejected, mainly due to resistance from 
general practitioners and internists who where afraid of loosing a substantial 
9 The non-existence of geriatrics as a medical specialty should not be confused 
with a general lack of geriatric medicine. Of course there are geriatric beds and 
departments in German hospitals, but even their introduction during the mid-
1970s encountered resistance from the medical profession, which was afraid 
that a sp~cialty might materialize in the hospital for which no PGT guidelines 
existed (Arzte Zeitung 1991, March 6). 
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segment of their patients (Arzte Zeitung, May 3/4, 1991). Several other· 
proposals to create new specialties, such as physical and rehabilitation 
medicine or psychotherapy, were rejected as well. The only new specialty 
to find the agreement of a majority of delegates was human genetics (Arzte 
Zeitung, May 6, 1991), a field of specialization which will certainly not 
disturb the fee distribution of ambulatory care physicians. Although the 
upgrading of some surgical subspecialties into full specialties was also 
denied, the general tendency in Germany is in accordance with the afore 
mentioned hypothesis that the pressure for more specialties, as a result of 
resistance from office-based practitioners, is primarily channeled into the 
hospital. 
In the U.S., a quite similar procedure is laid down in the bylaws of the 
ABMS. Each ABMS member, i.e. medical board, has the right to submit a 
proposal to introduce a new type of certification or to modify an already 
existing certification (ABMS bylaws, sect. 9.4 (a)). This proposal is submitted 
to all ABMS members, who may agree by a two-third majority. The decision 
is based on assessing the "professional and scientific status" (sec. 9.4 (b)(3)) 
of the proposed area of specialization. Similar to the German requirements, 
the ABMS bylaws require (1) the "existence of a body of medical knowledge" 
which should be distinct from existing certifications, or more detailed, (2) 
a group of physicians working in the proposed area of specialization, (3) 
support by national medical organizations, and ( 4) the existence of 
educational opportunities for the new field. 
It was repeatedly asserted that the American medical profession, not least 
due to the ABMS system, is in a strong position to control the introduc-
tion of new specialties (Carboni 1982: 122 ff.; Havighurst/ King 1983: 141). 
But this opinion does not seem to be well founded. First, there is a large 
number of medical boards who grant certification without being members 
of the ABMS (Koska 1989). As can be seen from the example of the spe-
cialty of medical management, which recently has launched its own certi-
fying board (Montgomery 1990: 196), a newly coalesced specialty can 
proliferate without ABMS recognition. However, more relevant for the market 
value of a specialist designation is the incapacity of the average consumer 
to make solid judgments about the difference between a specialty granted 
by an ABMS-member board or an independent medical board. Second, aside 
from the board certificate, a physician's hospital privileges are a regularly 
used indicator of his medical competence (Havighurst/ King 1983: 145). The 
authority of ABMS certifications has been undermined since courts have 
repeatedly turned down board certification as an eligibility criteria for 
granting hospital privileges (Starr 1982: 357; Hall/ Ellmann 1990: 165). Third, 
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even the capacity of the ABMS itself to restrict the growth of medical special-
ties does not have a very impressive record. Although the last general 
qualification to be recognized by the ABMS was emergency medicine back 
in 1976, a look at the increase of special and added qualifications indicates 
that the dynamics of expanding the realm of medical specialism remain 
unabated. It is likely that the ABMS agrees with the introduction of new 
subspecialties because most member boards use this as a competition 
parameter. It should be noted, however, that economic competition may 
produce varying results. In both the U.S. and the German cases, there is a 
competitive motive to introduce new specialties. However, whereas the U.S. 
system of regulation lacks an opportunity for slowing down the increase of 
specialties, those segments among German physicians who are interested in 
blocking the introduction of new specialties have at their disposal an effective 
regulatory mechanism for vetoing new specialties, so that the German case 
can be characterized as controlled specialism. As expected, regulatory systems 
play an important role in the creation of new medical specialties. The 
relevance of this intervening variable, however, is clearly overestimated if 
it is regarded as a sufficient explanatory factor in itself, because some of the 
independent variables exert an influence without being connected with the 
regulatory system. Some aspects of this problem will be raised in the 
following discussion. 
5. Concluding Discussion 
This paper has argued that the impact of variables, which are commonly 
assumed to influence the phenomenon of medical specialization, has to be 
assessed by considering the mediating effect of country-specific institutional 
frameworks. This kind of contextual analysis always poses the problem of 
working against general explanations, because of the complexity of 
interactions between independent variables and the institutional environ-
ment. In the present case, for example, some of the independent variables 
work in different directions at the same time, because they influence either 
different segments of the medical profession or different levels of the insti-
tutional context. Instead of resorting to generalization, the following discus-
sion will therefore, as far as possible, concentrate on the relation between 
the independent variables and the institutional context. In Table 2 the impact 
of the main independent variables is summarized. For each variable an ap-
pr9ximate positive and/ or negative causal direction is indicated, expressed 
as a ranking order extending from no impact (0), minor impact ( + ), medium 
impact (++), to strong impact (+++). 
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Table 2: Impact of Independent Variables on Medical Specialization 
1. Progress of me-
dical technology 
and knowledge 
2. Market forces, 
intraprofessional 
competition 
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I+ - ++ 
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nal factors, speciali-





I o - + 










Only minor incentives 
for researchers and 
educational institutions 
to push forward spe-
cialization 
I+ 
Only indirect influence 
of the central govern-
ment, especially 
through its authority 
to regulate the num-
ber of hospital posi-
tions 
- I 
Concept of District 
General Hospital has 
worked against the 
creation of new speci-
alties 
(1) Progress in medical and technological knowledge has supported specialty 
proliferation in all cases. The rating of the causal relevance of this variable 
is essentially based on the degree of restriction which the diffusion of medical 
and technological innovations have to face. The U.S. health care system is 
unusually receptive to new technologies: almost no constraints are imposed 
on the application of new diagnostic and therapeutical procedures and devices. 
In Britain, on the other hand, the dissemination of medical technologies is 
slowed down by the NHS administrative machinery, in which purchase 
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decisions have to pass through a fairly complex structure of committees 
(Stocking 1988: 159-163) which are charged with enforcing the financial 
constraints of the NHS.10 In the German case, regulations on medical technolo-
gies proved to be not very efficient, particularly in slowing down the diffusion 
of large-scale medical devices. Thus researchers and specialty societies may 
seize the opportunity to adopt the mold of new technologies. The degree 
to which this variable supports specialization therefore depends on the 
institutional capacity of health care systems to restrict the proliferation of 
new medical technologies. 
(2) As the previous discussion has emphasized, physicians in the three countries 
are exposed to market competition to varying degrees. In Britain, competition 
for patients, as a potential cause of specialization, is almost nonexistent for 
hospital specialists. Although GPs in private practice may exercise some 
economic competition with colleagues, they cannot utilize specialist skills or 
status for gaining a competitive advantage, due to the referral system which 
restricts the specialist status as well as the provision of special services to 
consultants. In the German case, office-based physicians have an incentive 
to engage in a specialty and do so. However, due to the vigorously enforced 
limitation of practice, which restricts the specialists' activities to his field, 
becoming a specialist has its economic limitations. This is the decisive differ-
ence to the U.S., where it is possible to link the status and income opportunities 
of a medical specialty with the ability to treat all patient categories. With 
regard to this variable, the institutional positioning of physicians and systems 
of payment are responsible for the extent to which competition will influence 
medical specialism. 
(3) A somewhat similar condition can be found with regard to medical research 
and education as causal factors for specialization. In the U.S., both individual 
researchers and medical schools are pushed forward by the "grants economy", 
which fosters an escalation of specialization. Even subspecialties are highly 
prestigious in the U.S., mainly because research grants are acquired by those 
highly specialized researchers who are working on the most promising medico-
technological innovations (Fryer 1991: 218). In contrast, the situation of re-
search and education in Britain and Germany is oriented towards patient 
care, thus generating only minor or moderate incentives for specialization. 
In both cases, individual researchers may be intereste0. in venturing into a 
new field of specialization, but they cannot count on the institutional support 
of the medical school. Germany's slightly higher rating than Britain's in this 
10 The different approach to technology between Britain and the United States 
is extensively discussed by Hollingsworth (1986) and Payer (1988). 
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case can be attributed to the activities of the specialty societies that are at 
least lobbying for new specialties. This leads to the assumption that the 
relevance of this variable is strongly determined by the institutional separation 
or integration of research and patient care inside medical schools. 
(4) Governmental support for specialty proliferation remains of low signifi-
cance in each of the three countries. Despite the fact that the formation of 
specialties such as pediatrics and rehabilitation medicine in the U.S. (Halpern 
1988: 73 f.; Berkowitz 1981), geriatrics in Britain (Carboni 1982: 81), and public 
health in Germany came about with active governmental support, this variable 
remains of limited relevance. Government activities had only an indirect impact 
on specialty development in Germany, where there is but a rough legisla-
tive framework, and Britain, where the Central Government has the authori-
ty to determine the number of consultant positions. It should be conceded, 
however, that separating governmental impact on specialization from other 
independent variables is sometimes difficult. In the British case, for example, 
restrictions imposed on medical specialism that emanate from the NHS could 
be regarded as government-related as well as organization-related. 
(5) Such organizational factors had the most positive impact on specializa-
tion in the U.S. Aside from the growth of specialized hospital care, it was 
in particular the proliferation of large group practices and HMOs which 
provided an organizational opportunity for physicians to specialize in the 
area of ambulatory care. No equivalent organizational consequences have 
emerged in British or German ambulatory care. In the latter case, however, 
there is some evidence that the hospital, as the organizational harbour of 
most sophisticated diagnosis and treatment techniques, has increased the drive 
towards medical specialization, whereas in Britain the concept of the District 
General Hospital has rather transformed this organizational factor into a 
restraining force. 
These diverging patterns of medical specialism make it very difficult to reach 
some sort of generalization since it runs the danger of violating the complexity 
of causal relations. Nonetheless, the analysis has revealed a major implication, 
which is particularly worthwhile for comparative research into professions, 
especially the medical profession. Specialization among physicians raises very 
different interests or intraprofessional conflicts. In Britain, no visible conflicts 
about medical specialism have occurred since a two-tiered professional structure 
has been established. By contrast, in Germany specialization-linked conflicts 
are intensifying due to their importance for income distribution. In the U.S., 
finally, despite fierce competition among physicians, in which specialization 
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plays an important role, the issue does not raise serious conflicts, obviously 
because no regulatory levers such as those used in Germany are available. 
Thus the medical profession develops quite different interests across coun-
tries in relation to aspects which are generally assumed to take a uniform 
shape. This is not peculiar to the present analysis. Furthermore, other important 
facets of the medical profession such as clinical autonomy (Schulz/ Harrison 
1986) or preferences vis-a-vis private practice (Immergut 1991), are regarded 
from remarkably different points of view across nations. This assumption 
does not make research about professions any easier. On the contrary, it requires 
a greater amount of awareness, and recognition of the fact that, in comparative 
research, the things that often appear similar are, in reality, very different. 
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Appendix I: Data Sources for Figure 1 
Great Britain: DHSS, Digest of Health Statistics for England and Wales. London: 
HMSO 1969 [1949 - 1971]; DHSS, Health and Personal Social Services Statistics 
for England, London: HMSO, various editions [1972 - 1989]. 
United States: The President's Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation, 
Building America's Health, Vol. III. Washington, DC: GPO [1931 - 1949]; National 
Center for Health Statistics, Health Resources Statistics, Health Manpower and 
Health Facilities 1976-77 Edition, DHEW Pub. No. (PHS) 79-1509, Hyattsville, 
MD 1979 [1950 - 1970]; Rosemary Stevens, American Medicine and the Public 
Interest. New Haven/ London: Yale University Press 1971 [1931 - 1960]; Gene 
Roback/ Lilian Randolph/ Bradley Seidman, 1990 Edition. Physician Characteris-
tics and Distribution and Distribution in the U.S. Chicago: American Medical 
Association [1965 - 1989]. 
Germany: Statistisches Bundesamt, Berufe des Gesundheitswesens, Fachserie 12, 
Reihe 5. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, various editions. 
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Appendix II: Calculation Procedure for Figure 1 
Great Britain: Community health physicians were excluded because they appear 
as a separate category as late as 1974, in the aftermath of the 1974 NHS 
reorganization. Data on hospital physicians are whole-time equivalents, data 
on GPs are absolute numbers. Data for 1949 - 1971 include England and Wales, 
data for 1972 ff. only include England. The specialist ratio for 1949 is based 
on an estimate of GPs by the Royal Commission 1979: 209. The following 
physician categories where added up and then calculated as a respective 
percentage of all GPs and all hospital medical staff: consultants and senior 
hospital medical officers (SHMOs) with allowance, associate specialists (for-
merly medical assistants), other staff and SHMOs without allowance. Regarding 
the status of the excluded categories such as clinical assistants and hospital 
practitioners, cf. Dowie 1987: 54. 
Germany: Specialist ratios are calculated as a percentage of approved specialists 
("Arzte mit Fachgebietsbezeichnung") plus specialists in family practice ("Facharzte 
fiir Allgemeinmedizin"). 
United States: Specialist ratios for 1965 - 1989 are calculated as a percentage 
of self-designated specialists in relation to general practitioners plus specialists 
in family practice. Earlier years are based on data about "full-time specialists", 
which have been calculated as percentage of all active MDs. Doctors of 
Osteopathy (DOs) are excluded. 
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Appendix III: Formally Approved Medical Specialties (including dates of 
inauguration) 
ABMS Certificates 
Aerospace Medicine 1953 Neurology 1934 
Allergy and Immunology 1972 Child Neurology 
Diagnostic Laboratory Neurological Surgery 1940 
Immunology 1986 Critical Care Medicine 
Anatomic & Clinical Pathology 1936 Nuclear Medicine 1971 
Blood Banking/ Obstetrics and Gynecology 1930 
Transfusion Medicine 1973 Gynecologic Oncology 1974 
Chemical Pathology 1950 Maternal & Fetal Medicine 1974 
Cytopathology 1989 Reproductive Endocrinology 1974 
Dermatopathology 1974 Critical Care 
Forensic Pathology 1959 Occupational Medicine 1955 
Hematology 1952 Ophthalmology 1916 
Immunopathology 1983 Orthopedic Surgery 1934 
Medical Microbiology 1949 Hand Surgery 1989 
Neuropathology 1947 Otolaryngology 1924 
Pediatric Pathology 1990 Pediatrics 1933 
Radioisotopic Pathology 1974 Diagnostic Laboratory Immunology 1986 
Anesthesiology 1941 Pediatric Cardiology 1961 
Critical Care Medicine 1986 Pediatric Critical Care Medicine 1987 
Colon and Rectal Surgery 1934 Pediatric Endocrinology 1978 
Dermatology 1932 Pediatric Hematology-Oncology 1974 
Dermapathology 1974 Pediatric Nephrology 1974 
Dermatological Immunology/ Pediatric Pulmonology 1986 
Diagnostic and Neonatal-Perinatal Medicine 1975 
Laboratory Immunology 1985 Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation 1947 
Diagnostic Radiology Plastic Surgery 1937 
Emergency Medicine 1976 Hand Surgery 1990 
Family Practice 1969 Public Health & 
Internal Medicine 1936 Preventive Medicine 1960 
Cardiac Electrophysiology 1992 Psychiatry 1934 
Cardiovascular Disease 1941 Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 1959 
Critical Care Medicine 1987 Geriatric Psychiatry 1991 
Diagnostic Laboratory Radiology 1934 
Immunology 1986 Nuclear Radiology 1957 
Endocrinology and Metabolism 1972 Radiation Oncology 
Gastroenterology 1941 Surgery 1937 
Geriatric Medicine 1988 Pediatric Surgery 1975 
Hematology 1972 Surgery of the Hand 1989 
Infectious Disease 1972 Surgical Critical Care 1986 
Medical Oncology 1973 General Vascular Surgery 1982 
Nephrology 1972 General Vascular Surgery 1988 
Pulmonary Disease 1941 Thoracic Surgery 1948 
Rheumatology 1972 Urology 1935 
Sources: ABMS Annual Report & Reference Handbook - 1990. Evanston, Ill.: ABMS, 1 ~90, 
62ff.; George Rosen, Preventive Medicine in the United States 1900 -1975. New York: Prod1st., 
1977, 231; Rosemary Stevens, American Medicine and the Public Interest. New Haven/ London: 
Yale University Press, 1971, 73. 
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Sources: Health and Personal Social Services Statistics for England (various editions); Rosemary 
Stevens, Medical Practice in Modern England. New Haven/ London: Yale Univ. Press 1966 
passim. 
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